Fall 2001 Crim Pro I Final Exam Model Answer

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I FINAL EXAM MODEL ANSWER

David A. Moran

Fall 2001

Problem One

(A) Statement #1. This statement is out because it was obtained in violation Miranda. D was in custody and was subjected to direct questioning. Even though the question seemed innocuous, it was a direct question and D’s answer was responsive to it, not volunteered. There will be no fruit of the poisonous tree from Statement #1 because it was a mere Miranda violation (Elstad). Statement #2. This statement is almost certainly in despite the direct questioning in the absence of Miranda warnings or waiver because the questioning appears to fall within the booking exception. D may argue that occupation is not a routine booking question, but that argument probably fails as occupation would seem to be the sort of question that would routinely be asked during booking. Statement #3. This statement is out because of a Miranda/Edwards violation. On March 15, D unambiguously invoked his Miranda right to counsel, which means that B could not question him later on any subject so long as D remained in custody unless D initiated. D remained in custody and B, not D, initiated the interview on March 16, so Statement # 3 must be suppressed. The statement would probably not be suppressed because of the Sixth Amendment. D’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached on the auto theft charge on March 15, but B apparently did not deliberately elicit any information from D about that charge. D could argue, however, that asking D about Vaughn under these circumstances amounts to deliberately eliciting info about the auto theft and, therefore, the statement would be out under Moulton. Again, there would be no fruit of the poisonous tree from this violation. Statement #4. This statement is probably in. Even though D has invoked his Miranda/Edwards rights twice, he is no longer in custody so Miranda has no application at all. D’s only argument is that the questioning violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The prosecution will argue, probably successfully, that B’s question about Vaughn did not deliberately elicit information about the auto theft charge, but D will argue that asking about Vaughn does amount to deliberately eliciting information about the auto theft charge as well.

(B) Statements #1-2. The exact same analysis applies as in Part A because there is nothing offense specific about the Miranda issues discussed. Statement #3. The statement is out because of the Miranda/Edwards violation as in Part A. Unlike Part A, there is no Sixth Amendment issue at all because D had not yet been charged with murder. Statement #4. This statement is definitely in as there is no Miranda issue (no custody) and no Sixth Amendment issue at all as D still hasn’t been charged with murder. Statement #5. This statement is definitely out for two reasons. First, D’s Sixth Amendment rights attached to the murder charge when he was arraigned on March 19 and B deliberately elicited information from him on that charge. The statement is also out because D was back in custody and B questioned him without Miranda warnings. Vaughn’s Body. The body is almost certainly out because it is the fruit of the poisonous tree from the Sixth Amendment violation in obtaining Statement #5. Since Miranda doesn’t produce poisonous fruit, it does not matter that Statement #5 also involved a Miranda violation. The body was not found through means independent of D’s Statement #5 and there was no attenuation between that statement and B finding the body. The prosecution could argue inevitable discovery, but it’s doubtful the police could prove that they inevitably would have searched the basement of this abandoned house.

Problem Two

(A) The Fourth Amendment applies because having military pilots shoot down a civilian airliner amounts to a government seizure of both the airplane and all of the people aboard the plane.

(B) Since the government’s primary purpose in shooting down the airliners is not to detect or prosecute crime but to protect the public safety, this activity is a “special needs” seizure that will require some degree of suspicion, but not probable cause, which is the level of suspicion required only when the government’s primary purpose is crime control.

(C) Since this is a special needs seizure, the government’s justification for the seizure must be balanced against the degree of intrusion involved (Camara). Since the degree of intrusion is extremely high (almost certain death for everyone aboard the plane), the government justification must also be extremely high, which means that the government should have a relatively high degree of suspicion that the hijackers intend to cause great loss of life and/or mayhem by crashing the plane into a target on the ground.

Problem Three

(A)(1) Crack in D’s Coat. D has three arguments to suppress the crack, at least two of which should succeed. First, he can argue that there was insufficient suspicion to justify a Terry stop. At the time S made the stop, she knew that the car was not from the neighborhood but was registered to an upper class suburb, that the occupants were young white people in a minority neighborhood late in the evening, and that the driver appeared unfamiliar with the neighborhood. D will argue that there are perfectly legitimate reasons why white suburbanites might be in a minority neighborhood, but the prosecution will respond that the facts, taken together, are suspicious enough to amount to reasonable suspicion. Second, D will argue, probably successfully, that even if the Terry stop was legal, the suspicion that he is in the neighborhood to buy drugs does not justify a frisk because there is no reasonable suspicion that drug users (as opposed to drug dealers) are armed and dangerous (Sibron v. New York). Third, even if the stop and frisk were legal, it would be OK for S to pull out the hard object, but once she saw that it was a bottle, there was no ground for her to open it. If the Terry stop was legal but the frisk was not, the prosecution may argue inevitable discovery because D would have been arrested and thoroughly searched once the crack was found in C’s purse, which, in turn, led to the crack in the trunk. (2) Crack in C’s Purse. D has no standing to complain about violations of C’s rights or the search of her purse, but, if he is successful in arguing that the initial Terry stop of him was illegal, the crack in C’s purse was the fruit of that illegal Terry stop. If the Terry stop was legal but the Terry frisk of D or the opening of the bottle was illegal, D can get the crack in C’s purse suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree if S searched the purse only because she found the crack on D. The prosecution can defeat that argument by showing that S would have searched C’s purse even if she had found nothing on D (independent basis). (3) Crack in Trunk. D has no standing in the trunk of E’s car (Rakas), so D wins only if it is the fruit of the illegal Terry stop or by arguing that S searched the trunk only because she found the crack on him during an illegal Terry frisk of D. In response to the latter argument, the prosecution will argue that the probable cause which justified opening the trunk under the automobile exception search also came from the search of C’s purse, to which D lacks standing to complain. If D’s arguments fail, it won’t do him any good to claim ownership of the bag and the crack in the bag because, under the automobile exception, S can open the bag in the trunk. (4) Conversation in Police Car. There is no Miranda issue (no questioning), so D’s only argument is that the entire conversation is the fruit of the illegal Terry stop, which led to the arrest of everyone.

(B)(1) E, like D, must argue that the Terry stop of the car was without reasonable suspicion (E has standing because was seized when the car was stopped) and that the crack found in D’s coat is the fruit of that Terry stop. She has no standing to complain about the frisk of D or the opening of his bottle.* (2) E can only get the crack from C’s purse suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree from an illegal Terry stop since she has no standing to complain about the search of C’s purse. (3) E has standing in the trunk of her car, but the search of the trunk and opening the bag would be OK under the automobile exception once S found drugs on D and/or C. Therefore, E’s only argument is that the crack in the trunk is the fruit of an illegal Terry stop. It’s doubtful that E validly consented to the search of the bag (she simply agreed to open up the trunk and she was detained at the time), but the prosecution does not need consent since there was probable cause to look for drugs in the trunk. (4) As with D, E’s only argument is that the entire conversation is the fruit of an illegal Terry stop.

(C)(1) C’s arguments here are the same as E’s arguments. (2) C can get the crack from her purse suppressed as fruit of an illegal Terry stop or by arguing that the search of her purse was illegal. The search of her purse would not seem to be justified by a Terry frisk because there is no reasonable suspicion that a drug user is armed and dangerous and because a Terry frisk involves clothing, not containers carried separately, though the prosecution can argue that a weapon can be as easily hidden in a purse as in clothing. The prosecution can also argue that even if the search of the purse fails as a Terry frisk, C’s purse could be searched under the automobile exception once crack was found on D (Houghton), but here the purse is outside of the car so it’s not clear that the automobile exception would apply. The prosecution can also argue that the crack in C’s purse would have been inevitably discovered because she certainly would have been arrested and searched after the crack was found in the trunk under the automobile exception, which applied once the crack was found on D. (3) C’s arguments here are the same as D’s because C and D lack standing in the trunk. (4) Same as D’s and E’s argument.

* I’m assuming that neither C nor E can plausibly claim ownership of the bottle in D’s jacket. If they could, they would have standing to object to the opening of the bottle but not the frisk that uncovered it.